WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMIS.

RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

High Court of Justice, ChanceV Division
WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.
A man cannot dispose of his body by will; it is the executors' duty to bury it,
and they have the right to possession of it in the meantime.
Testator gave his body to the plaintiff, who was not an executrix, and gave her
directions for cremating it. The relatives would not permit this, and with the consent of the executors buried the deceased, he being a Roman Catholic, in the unconsecrated part of i cemetery. Afterwards the plaintiff applied to the Home Secretary
for a license to remove tjhe body, which was given on the understanding, implied from
the plaintiff's letters, that the body was not to be cremated, but was to be buried in
consecrated ground. The plaintiff took up the body, burnt it, and then brought an
acti6n against the executors to recover the costs of so doing: Held, that she could
not recover ; as (1) the gift of the body was bad in law and void ; (2) the removal
of the body, being done under a license which was given for a purpose other than
that for which it was used, was illegal ; and- (3), even if it were not an illegal act,
it was, at all events, a fraud upon the license, and a court of equity would not entertain a claim arising out of it.

THIS was an action against the executors and residuary legatees
of one Cookenden, to recover costs incurred by the plaintiff in
cremating the body of the testator.
The testator made his will in December 1868; and in May 1874,
he, by a third codicil, appointed the defendants, Williams and Davenport, executors and trustees.
By a fourth codicil, dated April 12th 1875, he directed that three
days after his death, or as soon as convenient, his body shorid be
given to the plaintiff, to be dealt with by her as he 'had directed in
a letter to her. He then gave her a Wedgwood vase, to be used for
the purpose directed by the letter , and directed that the costs incurred by her in perfbrming the instructions contained in the letter
should be paid by his executors, on production of account and
vouchers, within three months after his death.
The letter was written on the 28th of March 1875, and contained instructions as to the burning of his body and the disposal
of the ashes.
The testator died on the 21st of Deceniber 1875; on the 23d
he was buried by his nearest relatives, of whom the plaintiff was
not one, but only a friend. The executors concurred in and were
present at the funeral. -The plaintiff-protested against it, but to no
purpose, and she was present at it. The testator, being a Roman
Catholic, was buried in the unconsecrated part of the Brompton
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Cemetery, but the grave was consecrated according to the rites of
that church. On the 3d of March 1876, the plaintiff wrote to the
Home Secretary, telling him of the codicil and letter, and asking
for leave to remove the body for the purpose of having it burnt or
placed in consecrated ground. In answer to this she was told that
permission to remove the body for cremation at that time after burial
could not be given, but was asked to what burial-ground she proposed to remove it. In answer to that she wrote, saying nothing
more about cremation, that she intended to take the body to a certain churchyard in Wales. The plaintiff then got a license, under
20 & 21 Vict. c. 81, to remove the body "from the grave in which
it is interred in the unconsecrated portion of the Brompton Cem
etery." She informed the executors that she intended to cremate
the body as soon as she could; but she did not actually exhume it
till March 1878, when she sent it to Milan, and had it burnt. The
ashes were sent back and buried in consecrated ground. She then
demanded payment of the costs of thus dealing with the body, 3211.,
and, on being refused, brought this action.
Higgins, Q. C., and Laing, for the plaintiff.-The codicil and
the letter between them made a complete ° disposition, although the
letter was not admitted to probate: Quihampton v. Going, 24 W.
R. 917; Bizzey v. Flight, Id. 957; L. R., 3 Oh. D. 269. [KAY,
J.-Is this bequest of a body valid? In Beg. v. Sharpe, 5 W. R
318, 7 Cox 0. 0. 214, Mr. Justice ERLE says that our law recognises no property in a body.] It seems that the person who has
possession of the body has the duty of burying it: Beg. v. Stewart,
12 Ad. & E. 773. The plaintiff had possession by virtue of the
license; you cannot go behind that.

[KAY, J.-It

is the duty of

the executors to bury the deceased: Williams on Executors, 8th
ed., p. 972. I want authority to show that a contrary disposition
can be made.] The plaintiff was executrix for this purpose. The
directions were not against public law.
W. S. Owens, for the defendant, Williams, took no active part
in the action.
Bigby Q. C., and Popham, for the other defendants.-The executors are the only persons who have any right to the possession of
the body: Beg. v. Fox, 2 Q. B. 246. These directions are like

510

WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS.

directions to keep up a tombstone, which are not void: Voyd v.
.ULoyd, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 255 ; but are honorary trusts only : Dowson
v. .Small, 22 W. R. 514, L. R.; 18 Eq. 114. There is no positive
law as to the illegality of cremating, but it is against our general
law. It is an indictable offence to take up a body: Rex v. Lynn,
2 T. R. 733. The license was not given for the purpose for which
it was used.

Higgins, in reply.- Cremation cannot be said to be indecent or
offensive to morals, as in Cripps' Laws of the Church and Clergy,
5th ed., p. 776, it is spoken of as an ancient and widely diffused
mode of burial. The class of cases referred to were all directed
against "body snatching :" Russell on Crimes, 5th ed., vol. 1, pp.
611-620. The sum spent in carrying out the testator's wishes, as
we considered ourselves bound to do, is not too mucb considering
what was to be done, and the value of the estate: Stag v. _Punter,
3 Atk. 119. Your lordshi* has relieved me from considering the
question of the three months' limit in which the expenses were to
be demanded.
KAY, J.-It is clear that there can be no property in a human
corpse. In Beg. v. Shiarpe, which was a case of an indictment for
digging open a grave and removing a corpse from it, the defendant's family were Dissenters, and his mother was buried in a burial
ground of that sect, but his father being recently dead, he wished
to remove his mother's remains to the place where he intended to
inter his father; he then got leave to open the grave, under pretence of wishing to see whether it would hold his father's coffin,
'took out his mother's remains and carried them away. The court,
though it gave him credit fqr having acted with go6d motives, ffirmed .the conviction. Mr. Justice ERLE, who delivered the judgment, said that the defendant had wrongfully opened the grave, as
the license he had was given him for a different purpose from that
for which he had used it; and, also, "that our law recognises no
,property in a body."
The next question is, What is the duty of the executors as to
burial ? In Williams on Executors, at p. 972, it is stated that it
is their duty to bury th6 dead body in a manner suitable to the
estate which the testator left behind him. It is said that that only
means that they are responsible as to the expenses, but it seems to
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me to mean that the persons who are responsible for the actual burial of the body are primafacie the executors.
It is, moreover, shown by Beg. v. Fox, following Beg. v. Scott,
reported in a note to it, where a peremptory mandamus was issued
to a gaoler, who sought to retain the body of a. prisoner until certain claims he had against him were satisfied, ordering him to
deliver the body to the executors, that the executors hfive the right
of possession and custody of the corpse until burial.
It follows from these cases that a man cannot dispose of his body
by will. I asked whether there was any authority contrary to
that, and I have been referred to none. Accordingly, the direction
in the codicil that the testator's body was to be delivered to the
plaintiff, who is not an executrix, is bad in law and void. She had
no property in the body, and could not have enforced delivery of it
to her.
The purpose named in the letter cannot make the gift either better or worse, but it was confessedly for cremation, and a question
might arise whether that was legal according to the law of this
country. That question, however, I shall not now decide.
There are still two other questions, the answers to which are
equally fatal to this claim. I preface my remarks upon this part
of the case by saying that I have no doubt that the plaintiff thought
she was bound to carry out the testator's wishes, and I absolve her
from any intention to act illegally or contra bonos mores. But it
seems to me evident from the letters between her and the Home
Office, that the license was given, not for the purpose of cremation,
but on the understanding conveyed by the plaintiff's letter, that it
was to be used for the purpose of removing the body to consecrated
ground.
Yet, notwithstanding that representation, the plaintiff
expressed to the executors her intention of carrying out, and did
carry out, her original design of cremation. I have no hesitation
in saying that that act was illegal, and if the Home Secretary had
known sooner of the plaintiff's intention he would have prevented
it by revoking his license, as he did when it was too late. Moreover, the court would have restrained it by an injunction, if the
executors had applied to it to do so. It has also been argued that
it was a misdemeanor, but I need not decide that now.
If that was the only question, it would prevent the plaintiff from
recovering the money. But even supposing the act was not an
illegal one, could any one come to a court of equity to recover ex-
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penses incurred about such an act as this, an act which was, in fact,
a fraud on the license ? Such a claim could not be entertained for
a moment.
This action, in my opinion, fails entirely from" any one of the
reasons which I have given, and I, therefore, dismiss it with costs.
Action dismissed.
The questions involved in this case are
both novel and interesting. The ease,
so far as relates to the right of a person
to direct the disposal of his body after
death, appears to be ore of first impression. Cases relating to conflicting
claims of the rights of custody between
different relations, after burial, are not
uncommon. There are also some dicta
in this country which would seem to
recognise the right of a person to provide by will for the disposition of his
body, but the point does not appear to
have directly arisen in any case, and
no authorities are cited to sustain such
dicta. Even those dicta do not afford
any countenance to the dcetrine that the
body can be otherwise disposed of than
by burial. See Pierce v. Swan Point
C'netery, 10 R. I. 227, per POTTER,
J. ; Report of Hon. Samuel B. Ruggles,
3d conclusion, 4 Bradf. Sur. 503. And
see Lowry v. Plitt, 16 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 155 and note. Almost without
exception the authorities lay down the
rule, as stated in the principal case, that
there can, at the common law, be no
property in a dead body: 2 Black. Com.
429 ; 2 East P1. Or., el. 16, sect. 89 ;
Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. 141,
143 ; Afeagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 284 ;
The ilatter of the Brickc Presbyterian
Church, 3 Edw. Oh. 155, 17 8; Reg. v.
Sharpe, 1 Dears. & Bell 16' ; s. c. 7
Cox 0. 0. 214. There can be no property in a corpse ; and, therefore, stealing it is no felony, but a very high misdemeanor. In the case of Dr. Hpndyside, where trover was brought against
him for two children that grew together,
Lord Chief Justice WITLES held that

the action could not lie, as no person
had any property in corpses : 2 East P1.
Or., cl. 16, sect. 89.
In Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10
R. I. 227, POTTER, J., said: "That
there is no right of property in a dead
body, using the word in its ordinary
sense, may well be admitted. Yet the
burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much
greater degree than many matters of
actual property. There is a duty imposed by the universal feeling of mankind to be discharged by some one
towards the dead; a duty, and we may
also say a right, to protect from violation ; and a duty on the part of others
to abstain from violation ; it may, therefore, be considered as a sort of quasi property, and it would be discreditable to
any system of law not to .provide a
remedy in such a case. * * * But the
person having charge of it cannot be considered as the owner of it in any sense
whatever; he holds it as a sacred trust
for the benefit of all who may from
family or friendship have an interest in
it, and we think that a court of equity
may well regulate it as such, and change
the custody, if improperly managed. So,
in the case of custody of children, certain persons are pruna facie entitled to
their custody, yet the court will interfere
to regulate it.
"We think these analogies furnish a
rule for such a case, and one which will
probably do most complete justice, as the
court could always interfere in case of
improper conduct, e. g., preventing other
relatives from visiting the place for the
purpose of indulgence of feeling, or tes-
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tifying their respect or affection for the
deceased."
With reference to the same subject the
Hon. Samuel B. Ruggles, referee, in the
Matter of the Widening of Beckman
street, 4 Bradf. Sur. 503, 529, said:
"It will be seen that much of the apparent difficulty of this subject arises
from a false and needless assumption in
holding that nothing is property that
has not a pecuniary value. The rel
question is not of the disposable market
value of a corpse, or its remins, as an
article of traffic, but it is of the sacred
and inherent right to its custody, in order
decently to bury it, and secure its undisturbed repose." In the same inatter,
among other conclusions, he laid down
the rules, "that the right to bury a
corpse and to preserve its remains, is a
legal right which the courts of law will
recognise and protect ;" and "that the
right to protect the remains includes the
right to preserve them by separate
burial, and to select the place of sepulture, and to change it at pleasure."
In the case of Bogert v. The City of
Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134, 138, PEtiaxs, J. (without citing any authority,
and not *speaking for the court, and
the point not being necessary to the
decision of the case), laid down the
proposition "that the bodies of the
dead belong to the surviving relatives, in
the order of inheritance, as property, arid
that they, have the right to dispose of
them as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which the disposition of'
other property may be regulated. They
cannot be permitted to create a nuisance
by them."
This dictum is, however, so
contrary to the natural sentiments of
human nature, and so entirely opposed
to the current of judicial opinion upon
the subject, as to be without any weight
whatever. In Guthriev. Weaver, supra,
the much more rational rule is laid down
that the relatives have in regard to
the dead body only the right of interment.
VOL. XXX.-65

A creditor cannot legally arrest or
detain and prevent the burial of the
dead body of his debtor until his debt is
paid : Matthews on Executors 72;
Jones v. Ashburrham, 4 East 465, per
ELLEnBOROUGH, C. J. ; Reg. v. Fox, 2
Q. B. 246, cited by the court in the
principal case.
It is the duty of the executor or
expected administrator to bury the
deceased: Hood on Exr's 34; Wynkoop
v. Tlynkoop, 42 Penn. St 300. And a
conspiracy to prevent a burial is indictable at common law: Hood on
Exr's 35 ; Matthews on Exr's 72;
Rex v. Young, cited in 2 Term R. 734.
The absolute duty of an administrator
to bury terminates, however, with the
burial, and no subsequent expenses
would be a legal charge upon the estate
of the decedent, whether solvent or insolvent: Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42
Penn. St. 293. So universal is the
right of sepulture, that the common law,
as it seems, casts the duty of providing
it, and of carrying to the grave the
dead body, decently covered, of any person dying in such a state of indigence as
to leave no funds for that purpose, upon
the person under whose roof the death
takes place; for such person cannot
keep the body unburied, nor do anything wbich prevents Christian burial;
he can not, therefore, cast it out, so as
to expose the body to violation, or to
offend the feelings or endanger the
health of the living; and for the same
reason, he cannot carry the dead body
uncovered to the grave: Reg. v. Stewart, 12 Ad. & El. 773, per DENMAN, C.
J.; lVynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Pen.n St.
300, per READ, J.

It being conceded that there can, at
the common law, be no property in a
dead body, in the ordinary sense of the
term, but only a quasi property; or
more definitely, a "sound and inherent
right to its custody in order decently to
bury it, and secure its undisturbed repose," the question arises bow is this

